Institutions and Economic Growth in the MENA Countries: An Empirical Investigation by Using Panel data model by Becherair, Amrane
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Institutions and Economic Growth in the
MENA Countries: An Empirical
Investigation by Using Panel data model
Amrane Becherair
National High School of Statistics and Applied Economics
(ENSSEA) Algeria
3. August 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57683/
MPRA Paper No. 57683, posted 4. August 2014 11:56 UTC
 
 
 
1
Institutions and Economic Growth in the MENA Countries:  
An Empirical Investigation by Using Panel data model 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper will investigate the impact of institution on economic growth rates in 
MENA nations, using panel data model over the period 1995-2012. Within the 
framework of the neoclassical growth model, this study integrates a broad set of 
institutional variables such. Security of property rights, governance, political 
freedom and size of government are the indicators used in the study, facilitating 
identification of the most important institutions that account for the observed 
variations in economic growth rates among nations. We find that, the sign and 
significance of all of the variables are qualitatively similar to the results obtained 
by MRW (1992). We also find the human capital is highly significant at 99% with 
initial income and Investment Share in MENA countries. The Results indicate that 
the dummy variable for oil exporters is positive and significant, indicating that 
other things being equal, oil exporters would be expected to have higher economic 
growth rates in MENA Countries. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of 
additional evidence, suggest that (a) security of property rights, is the most 
significant institutions that explain the variations in economic growth rates, (b) 
The significant and negative sign on the government consumption, indicating that 
smaller governments are "better" in MENA countries. 
 
Keywords: MENA countries – Economic growth – Institutions- Panel data model 
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1-Introduction: 
The importance of institutions for economic development and growth has long 
been understood—emphasized, for example, in the writings of Adam Smith and, 
more recently, David Landes (1998), and recognized in the 1993 Nobel Prize 
awarded to Douglass North. In the past few years, however, there has been a 
resurgence of interest in this subject, including research into the sources of 
institutional differences across countries, the channels through which institutions 
may affect economic performance, and the quantitative importance of these links. 
 
Motivating much of this work is the renewed attention to the enormous cross-
country differences in incomes. Not only are the extremes of this global income 
distribution striking—GDP per capita ranging from about $100 a year in Ethiopia, 
for example, to over $43,000 in Switzerland—but so also is the uneven dispersion 
of incomes. It is notable, for example, how few countries have what could be viewed 
as an “intermediate” level of income, between about $6,000 and $16,000 per capita, 
and how many—including most of sub- Saharan Africa—have incomes of well 
under $1,000 per capita. Furthermore, while subsequent improvements in 
macroeconomic policies may have helped reverse the overall stagnation of per 
capita incomes among developing economies that set in early in the 1980s, these 
countries continue to face large and persistent income gaps relative to advanced 
economies. 
In this context, the observation that income differences appear closely 
correlated with indicators of institutional quality has attracted substantial 
attention.  In particular, recent work on growth and institutions has sought to 
identify the deep structural determinants of countries’ level of development. In 
contrast, the earlier growth accounting literature focused on the main proximate 
causes of growth, including capital accumulation (physical and human) and total 
factor productivity, together with macroeconomic and structural policies. Building 
on the close correlation between institutional quality and development, recent 
analyses attempt to address the possibility of reverse causality from development 
to institutions, and the relative significance of institutions compared with other 
influences on development, such as trade openness, geographical factors, and 
economic policies.  
This paper  aims to take stock of recent work on the impact of institutions on 
economic Growth, advance the debate through new empirical analysis in MENA 
countries, and—to the extent possible— come to some conclusions that may be 
relevant for policymakers.  
 
The first section considers briefly, what institutions mean, and How Are They 
Measured? And how they may affect economic growth. An empirical perspective on 
these issues is provided in the following section. In final section we measures the 
influence of institutional measures in income per worker, in MENA countries for 
offered some policy messages and conclusions, including a discussion of 
institutional measures that may contribute to economic development. 
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Section I: What Is Meant by the Term “Institutions” and How Are They 
Measured? 
Proxies for institutions were first introduced into cross-country growth and 
investment equations more than a decade ago, and recently this literature has 
experienced a renaissance. Researchers have used diverse measures, 
encompassing political instability, the attributes of political institutions, social 
characteristics and social capital, and measures of the quality of institutions that 
affect economic exchange. The literature on economic growth typically has 
classified and treated these proxies collectively as “sociopolitical measures.” This 
practice has tended to obscure the different channels through which institutions 
operate and has impoverished the interpretation of the role of institutions in 
growth. This is a serious flaw in analyzing developing countries, where weak 
institutions are implicated in low growth. 
 
A) Defining Institutions 
One of the most influential persons in the institutions literature is the Noble 
laureate Douglass C. North. The reason for North’s popularity is probably because 
his discussion of institutions is clear and intuitively appealing. In North’s 
definition of institutions, there are two important distinctions. The first of these is 
between institutions and organizations. Consider the following statement.  
It is the interaction between institutions and organisations that 
shapes the institutional evolution of an economy. If institutions 
are the rules of the game, organizations and their entrepreneurs 
are the players. (North, 1996, p. 345)  
There is here an important distinction between institutions and 
organizations, where organizations in this context are: Political bodies (political 
parties, councils etc), economic bodies (firms, trade unions etc), social bodies 
(churches, clubs etc), and educational bodies (schools and universities). 
Institutions are then the key determinant of what kind of organizations a society 
develops. The organizations will reflect the opportunities provided by the 
institutional framework; if the institutional framework promotes corruption, the 
organizations will be corrupt.  
 
The institutional framework seems here to be very important, but the 
definition of institutions so far only consists of “the rules of the game”. It is here 
that North makes his second important distinction; a distinction between formal 
and informal constraints:  
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), 
informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of 
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive 
structure of societies and specifically economies. (North, 1996, p. 344) 
 
The differences between formal constraints (rules) and informal constraints 
(norms) are interesting. The maybe most important difference is that rules can 
easily be changed, but norms cannot. Norms are said to give “legitimacy” to the 
rules. Since it is the norms that give legitimacy to the rules, a society that adopts 
the rules of another country will not necessarily experience the same economic 
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performance, due to differences in norms. This is because the most important 
enforcement of the rules is through the self-enforcing codes of behavior, norms and 
values. In order for the rules to have their desired effect, the underlying norms and 
values have to change in accordance with the rules. This change can however be a 
very lengthy process. The norms of a society have an even more dominant and 
important role then the presence of formal rules only (North, 1986, 1996). The 
discussion and interpretation of North motivates the following figure of plausible 
causal linkages:  
 
 
             Institutions 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Institutions are made up of informal and formal rules (norms and rules) where the 
informal rules determine the formal rules. It is then the informal and formal rules 
that together shape the behavior of organizations which help to determine 
economic performance. 
 
 
B) The Measurement of Institutions  
To measure institutions, the literature has focussed on several sets of variables. 
Here we discuss three. The first set, used initially by Knack and Keefer (1995) and 
Hall and Jones (1999), and more recently by Acemoglu et al. (2001), are survey 
indicators of institutional quality from the International Country Risk Guide, 
collected over the 1980s and 1990s. The second set, used most recently by Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002), is an aggregated index of mostly survey 
assessments of government effectiveness collected by Kaufmann et al. (2003). The 
third set, coming from the Polity IV data set collected by political scientists 
(Jaggers and Marshall, 2000), aims directly to measure the limits of executive 
power. 
Below we discuss these measures of institutions. We make three distinct 
points. First, all three data sets measure outcomes, not some permanent 
characteristics that North refers to. As such, all these measures (1) rise with per 
capita income, and (2) are highly volatile. Both of these facts are inconsistent with 
the view that they measure permanent or even durable features of the political 
environment. Second, the first two sets of measures of institutions are constructed 
so that dictators freely choosing good policies receive as high evaluations as 
governments constrained to choose them. An examination of these variables shows, 
for example, that dictators who chose to respect property rights-for example, in the 
USSR or Singapore-received high scores, which the literature has interpreted as 
 
 Norms Rules Organisations 
Economic 
Performance 
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having "good institutions.'' Even if these measures are extremely useful indicators 
of policy choices, they are by their very construction not constraints, and therefore 
unusable for discussions of how specific constraints on government that would 
guarantee the security of property rights. The Polity IV variables are intended to 
focus on political constraints, but we show that they too reflect political outcomes 
rather than durable constraints. 
 
Third, these measures of political institutions appear to be uncorrelated 
with the available constitutional measures of constraints on government coming 
from either electoral rules or courts. It is possible that these constitutional 
measures are noisy, and it is certain that "rules on the books'' are very different 
from what actually takes place in a country. But this is precisely the point: the 
institutional outcomes that scholars have used as measures of constraints have 
very little to do with the constitutional constraints, raising doubts about the 
effectiveness of changing political rules. 
Begin with the data from ICRG. The data include subjective assessments of 
risk for international investors along such dimensions as law and order, 
bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation by the government, and risk 
of government contract repudiation. Of all three data sets, this one is probably the 
most problematic. It is plain that these measures reflect what actually happened 
in a country rather than some permanent rules of the game. For example, in 1984, 
the top ten countries with the lowest expropriation risk include Singapore and the 
USSR. In these cases, the data obviously reflect the choices of dictators and not 
political constraints. Along similar lines, the data show a bizarre reduction in the 
risk of expropriation over time. Between 1982 and 1997, Iran moves from the score 
of 1 (highest expropriation risk) to 9 (close to the top score of 10), Libya from 1.5 to 
9, and Syria from 1.5 to 9. We are not familiar with significant institutional 
constraints on the leaders of Iran, Libya, and Syria; although of course in the last 
few years these dictators had stayed away from expropriation and the data reflect 
their choices. Indeed, consistent with the intellectual victory of the Washington 
Consensus, the data show that the average score on expropriation risk in the 
sample rises from 5 in 1982 to 9 (with the median  of  9.5)  in  1997.  Whatever 
expropriation risk measures, it is obviously not permanent rules, procedures, or 
norms supplying checks and balances on the sovereign.  
 
The Kaufmann et al. (2002) ""government effectiveness'' variable is likewise 
a clear outcome measure. Starting in 1996, these authors have aggregated a large 
number of subjective assessments of institutional quality into broad indices of 
government effectiveness. ""In government effectiveness, we combine perceptions 
of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political 
pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies into a 
single grouping'' ( p. 8). These are clear ex post outcomes, highly correlated with 
the level of economic development, rather than political constraints per se. Indeed, 
the country that receives the highest score in the world is Singapore, a state known 
both for its one party rule and for this party's chosen respect for private property. 
Polity IV data make the greatest attempt at measuring the political environment 
rather than dictatorial choices. Constraints on the executive refers to ""the extent 
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of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, 
whether individuals or collectivities.'' The highest score for this variable is 7, the 
lowest is 1. The rich democracies, but also countries like Botswana, India, and 
South Africa, tend to get the perfect score of 7. Dictatorships like Cuba, Iraq, North 
Korea, but also Pinochet's Chile get the worst score of 1, the communist countries 
such as China and USSR are in the middle with 3s. It is difficult to see how 
property is more secure in Mao's China than in Pinochet's Chile, but at least it is 
clear what the variable is trying to get at. 
 
The concern of this variable is, according to its creators, with the checks and 
balances between the various parties in the decision making process. However, a 
closer look at how this variable is constructed immediately reveals that it is an 
outcome measure, which reflects not the constraints, but what happened in the 
last election. When countries have inconsistent electoral experiences, their scores 
fluctuate wildly. For example, Haiti gets the worst score of 1 under the dictatorship 
during 1960-1989, Jumps up to 6 when Aristide is elected in 1990, goes back to 1 
when he is ousted during 1991-1993, rises again to 6 and even a perfect score of 7 
during 1994-1998 as Aristide and his party return to power (even though the 
elections had been widely criticized), but falls down all the way to 3 during 2000-
2001. Likewise, Argentina fluctuates between the worst scores under generals, and 
the best ones after elections, even when the elected leaders undermine the 
legislature and courts. The data make it obvious that Polity IV provides a rapidly 
moving assessment of electoral outcomes over time, not a measure of actual 
political constraints on government, and certainly not a measure of anything 
permanent or durable. And to the extent that rich countries are more likely to hold 
regular elections, ""constraints on the executive'' may well be a consequence of 
development rather than the other way around. 
Likewise, the measure of ""democracy'' in Polity IV reflects the extent to 
which ""the three essential, interdependent elements'' are actually adhered to. 
These include ""the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens 
can express effective preference about alternative policies and leaders, the 
existence of institutional constraints of the exercise of power by the executive (see 
above), and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in 
acts of  political  participation.''  Although the definition is intended to suggest 
some permanence, the construction of the variable, like that of the previous 
measure, reflects most recent experiences. 
 
Section II) Institutions and Growth: A Literature Review 
 
The majority of studies investigating the economic growth-institutions 
nexus use a version of the neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956), augmented to 
include measures of human capital (from Mankiw, Romer and Weil (MRW), 1992) 
and institutions.  
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Previous studies examine the relationship between one aspect of institutions 
and economic growth, without controlling for the presence of other institutions that 
could alter the significance of the relationships. Among the pioneers in the growth 
and institutions literature, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) explored the link 
between the Gastil indices of political freedom (civil liberties and political rights) 
and economic growth and found a marginal effect of civil liberties on growth. 
Results from Scully's (1988) analysis using the same indices provide similar 
support for the growth-political freedom nexus. Helliwell's (1992) study however 
does not find a significant net effect of democracy on growth. 
 
 Barro (1996) finds the overall effect of democracy on growth to be weakly 
negative, and some indication of a nonlinear relation in which more democracy 
enhances growth at low levels of political freedom but depresses growth when a 
moderate level of political freedom has already been attained. The more general 
conclusion of this study is that the advanced western countries would contribute 
more to the welfare of poor nations by exporting their economic systems, notably 
property rights and free markets, rather than their political systems, which 
typically developed after reasonable standards of living have been attained.  
 
Knack and Keefer (1995) pioneered the use of indicators of security of 
property rights in the growth literature, with the ICRG and BER! indices as 
proxies for this aspect of institutions. The results from their analysis indicate that 
institutions that protect property rights are crucial to economic growth. More 
recently, Mauro (1995) found corruption in countries to be growth retarding.  
 
In the last five years, a number of studies have used the Economic Freedom 
Index from the Fraser Institute to investigate the link between economic growth 
and institutions. Ali (1997), and Ali and Crain (1999) find economic freedom to be 
a more robust determinant of growth than political freedom and civil liberties. Ayal 
and Karras (1998) find that economic growth enhances growth both via increasing 
total factor productivity and via enhancing capital accumulation. In a study by 
Dawson (1998), economic freedom is found to be growth enhancing. Easton and 
Walker (1997) find that economic freedom is an important explanatory variable for 
steady-state levels of income. 
 
The addition of a variable for economic freedom is also shown to increase 
the explanatory power of the neo-classical growth model. Norton's (1998) study 
compares property rights to indicators of development and determines that the 
"well-being of the world's poorest inhabitants [is] sensitive to the cross-national 
specification of property rights." The paper shows that well specified property 
rights enhance the well-being of the world's most impoverished.  
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Results from empirical analyses suggest the existence of the economic 
growth institutions nexus, but statistical support is not uniform across all 
indicators of institutional quality. Depending on the institutional variables chosen, 
the group of countries in the analysis, and the time period of the study, the results 
are mixed. This study attempts to integrate all available indicators of institutional 
capital within the same model to determine the relative importance of each of these 
in explaining the variations in growth performance across nations. 
 
Section III) Empirical Study 
 
Using the framework of the neoclassical growth model, this study examines 
the relationship between economic growth and institutions in 15 nations for the 
period 1995 to 2012 through a pooled regression model. The sample distributed 
according to 2012 gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the 
World Bank Atlas method. The groups are :  
 
Table 1. Economic Development 
Group 1 
lower middle income, 
$1,036–4,085 
Group 2 
upper middle income, 
$4,086–12,615 
Group 3 
High income, $12,616 or 
more. 
 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 
 
Alegria Bahrain 
Morocco Iran, Islamic Rep. Kuwait 
Syrian Arab Republic Jordan Saudi Arabia 
Yemen, Rep Lebanon Qatar 
. Libya United Arab Emirates 
 Tunisia  
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database (july2013). 
 
The basic theoretical framework outlined in Solow (1956) and MRW (1992) 
is used for the analysis. The model assumes that the economies are characterized 
by a production function exhibiting the standard characteristics -constant returns 
to scale and diminishing returns with respect to each of the factors of production. 
It is also assumed that it is possible to derive the steady-state level of output for 
the model, and the dynamics of the path to such a steady-state can be described. 
Estimating equations are derived similar to Dawson (1998). 
 
The paper utilizes four measures of institutions. First: A measure of 
governance computed as a simple average of six indicators pertaining to the 
seminal work by Kaufmann et al (2005) and these are: Voice and Accountability, 
Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and 
Control of Corruption. The data set spans across the years 1995 to 2012 ( The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013 Update). The indicators take values 
ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 inclusive, with an increase consistently implying better 
quality of institutions. 
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Second: The measure of security of property rights is computed as a simple 
average of two indicators: risk of repudiation of contracts and risk of expropriation, 
measured on a scale of 0-10, with higher values indicating "better" ratings. The 
data set spans across the years 1995 to 2012 (2014, Index of economic freedom). 
 Third: Political freedom is computed as the simple average of indicators of 
civil liberties and political rights, measured on a scale of 1-7, between 1.0 and 2.5 
were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 “Partly Free," and between 5.5 and 
7.0 “Not Free.” The data set spans across the years 1995 to 2012 (Freedom House 
2014). 
Fourth: Government consumption as a share of total consumption is 
measured on a scale of 0-10, with larger values indicating smaller governments. 
The data set spans across the years 1995 to 2012 (2014, Index of economic freedom) 
 
Following previous studies in the literature, the data on growth rate of GDP 
per worker are derived from the Penn World Tables Mark 7.1 (Summers and 
Heston, 1991). Initial income and the period average for investment share are also 
from the same source. Labor force growth is derived from the world development 
indicators 2014, the data on human capital (secondary school enrolment, %) are 
taken from Barro and Lee (2010), and averaged for the years 1995-2010. Oil 
exporting economies is a dummy variable 1=OIL; 0=other, we constructed this 
dummy variable based on the World Bank classification. 
 
 As the basic hypothesis consists in stating that; Investment Share, Human 
Capital, property rights and the dummy variable are expected to be positively 
correlated with economic growth. Negative correlation between Labor Force and 
economic Growth, Uncertain correlation concerning the other variables.  
 
 
The MRW (1992) human-capital augmented version of the Solow model is 
first estimated for the sample of MENA countries. The model is of the form: 
  2.......43210 iiiiii alHumanCapitShareInvestmentGrowthLaborforceomeInitialIncGrowth  
 
The revised version of the model attempts to identify the most important 
components of the institutional variable that account for the differences in growth 
rates. The revised model is of the form:  
 
 3.............................................4
43210
iiiji
iiiii
OilnsInstitutio
alHumanCapitShareInvestmentGrowthLaborforceomeInitialIncGrowth




 
Where j=1…..4 and j=Governance, property rights, political freedom and 
government consumption. The standard assumptions and estimation procedures 
for SUR apply to this revised version of the model. 
 
The empirical results are displayed in Table [2] below. The various scenarios 
done are also explained after the Table in a very detailed manner. 
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Table 2: Factors affecting economic growth Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of 
GDP per worker, 1995-2012 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 4 
Intercept 0.013 
(3.79) *** 
0.014066 
(4.16) *** 
0.072 
(7.038) ) *** 
0.011 
 (1.57) 
0.0065 
 (0.82)  
Initial Income 1.09E-06 
(0.63) *** 
9.78E-07 
(0.65)  
5.47E-06 
(2.93) *** 
-6.63E-08  
(-0.039)  
-3.05E-07  
(-0.180)  
Labor Force Growth 0.035 
(1.78) * 
-0.034 
(1.79)* 
0.0036 
 (0.099)  
0.035 
(1.63) 
0.030  
(1.35)  
Investment Share 0.0004 
(3.13) *** 
0.0004 
(2.97) *** 
0.00027 
 (1.42)  
0.000557 
(3.49) *** 
0.00058 
 (3.62) ***  
Human Capital 0.0005 
(5.30) *** 
0.0005  
(-5.23) *** 
0.0008 
 (6.15) *** 
0.00053 
 (-4.62) *** 
0.00054  
(4.68) *** 
Oil Exporters _ 0.0008 
 (4.77) *** 
0.004 
 (3.09) *** 
-0.0007  
(-1.04) 
-0.0007 
 (-1.017)  
Property Rights _ _ 0.004 
 (4.52) *** 
-0.00012 
 (-0.19) 
-9.71E-05 
 (-0.14)  
Governance _ _ 0.028 
 (6.46) *** 
_ _ 
Political Freedom - _ 0.0019  
(4.59) *** 
_ _ 
Government 
Consumption 
- _ -0.0031 
 (-3.25) *** 
-3.07E-05 
(-0.037) 
0.0016 
 (1.39)  
Government 
Consumption squared 
_ _ _ _ 1.48E-08 
(1.90) ** 
R2 0.16 0.21 0.48 0.23 0.24 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.20 0.459 0.21 0.210 
Sample size 252 252 252 252 252 
All variables in logs. Parantheses contain p-values.  
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level. 
 
Table [2] shows the result from the pooled regression model. Each column 
contains information about the estimated coefficients of variables included in the 
regression.  
Model [I] reproduces MRW's (1992) human-capital augmented version of the 
Solow model for the MENA countries under consideration in this study. The sign 
and significance of all of the variables are qualitatively similar to the results 
obtained by MRW. The human capital is highly significant at 99% with initial income 
and Investment Share in MENA countries, Model [2] is an extended version of 
Model [l], with a dummy variable included for the oil exporters, to account for 
higher growth rates merely because of the presence of one natural resource, 
exports of which account for a significant fraction of GDP in these economies. As 
expected, the dummy variable for oil exporters is positive and significant, 
indicating that other things being equal, oil exporters would be expected to have 
higher economic growth rates. The sign and significance of the other variables in 
Model 2 is as expected.  
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Model [3] includes all of the institutional variables for the MENA countries 
included in the study. All four institutional variables affect economic growth rates 
positively. The significant and negative sign on the government consumption in 
Model [3], indicating that smaller governments are "better". Over the last century, 
the size and scope of government have expanded enormously, particularly in the 
industrial economies. The post-World War-II confidence in the government bred 
demands for it to do more. Industrial economies expanded the welfare state, and 
much of the developing world embraced state-dominated development strategies. 
The result was a tremendous expansion in the size and scope of government 
worldwide. State spending now constitutes almost half of total income in the 
established industrial countries, and around a quarter in the developing economies 
(World Development Report, 1997). The positive effect of government consumption 
on economic growth rates is a reflection of this shift in government consumption. 
In an attempt to determine the relative significance of the four component 
measures of institutional capital, a stepwise regression is employed, where we 
start with a model containing all of the component institutional indices (Model 3) 
and then individually drop those that are statistically insignificant. This approach 
results in governance and political freedom dropping out of the model, leaving us 
with Model [4], in which the security of property rights and size of government are 
the institutional variables that explain to a significant extent the differential 
growth performance across nations.  
 
the model [3] explains up to 50% of the variability in growth rates. More 
secure property rights lead to a high level of GDP per capita through their effect 
on allocative efficiency. When property rights are not well defined, resources 
maybe directed towards unproductive activities. Transaction costs also tend to be 
high, and may prevent mutually beneficial transactions. With well-defined 
property rights, growth will occur either through an increase in the quantity of 
factors of production or through a more efficient use of available factors of 
production. 
 
 
   The first direct effect of security of property rights on growth arises through 
a more efficient use of capital. Capital devoted to productive activities will enhance 
the productive capacity of the economy. The structure of property rights is also 
expected to affect the allocation of capital. The presence of a secure system of 
property rights promotes innovation, since rewards can be reaped from new 
products or processes. In the absence of property rights, human capital may be 
used for rent seeking and other redistributive activities. Other things being equal, 
growth rates are higher with a more secure system of property rights.  
 
For the sample of countries included in this study, the differences in growth 
rates is consistent with differences in their security of property rights. However, 
the lack of statistical significance for the institutions of governance in the cross-
country regression should not be construed to imply that this institution is 
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unimportant for the process of economic growth. In the context of New 
Institutional Economics, Williamson (2000) distinguishes four levels of social 
analysis. The top level is the social embeddedness. This is where the norms, 
customs, mores, traditions etc. are located. Religion plays a role at this level. 
Although an analysis of this level is undertaken by some economic historians, it is 
taken as given by most institutional economists. The New Institutional Economics 
has been concerned principally with levels 2 and 3. The second level is referred to 
as the institutional environment. Much of the economics of property rights are of 
a Level 2 kind. The third level is where the institutions of governance are located. 
Within this theoretical framework, there is a virtuous cycle of feedback between 
the governance structures and security of property rights. The high degree of 
correlation between these two institutions possibly captures this phenomenon, 
with the Level 2 variable dominating the effect of the Level 3 variable. 
 
Model [5], an extension of Model [4], tests for non-linearity of government 
consumption. Although the results seem to indicate decreasing returns when 
governments are too large, they should be interpreted with caution, since our 
sample consists predominantly of developing countries, where the average size of 
government is small. All of these countries with smaller governments lie in the 
increasing portion of the growth government consumption curve. Further analysis 
with a larger sample of countries is expected to yield more robust results. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper attempts to identify the most important institutional 
determinants of differences in economic growth rates among countries. It provides 
an analysis of which institutions prove to be growth enhancing in MENA countries 
for the period 1995 to 2012, from the pooled regression model. The results from the 
analysis are significant, and provide support for the historical evidence presented 
by North and Thomas (1973), Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) and North (1990). 
They show that the security of property rights provides incentives for economic 
growth in the world. Secure property rights also lead to an efficient allocation of 
investment and to an efficient use of capital.  
The results seem to indicate that: The usual of dummy variable for oil 
exporters is positive and significant, indicating that other things being equal, oil 
exporters would be expected to have higher economic growth rates.  
On the other hand, it was found that the government consumption is found 
to have an adverse impact on economic growth.so. smaller governments are 
"better". However, government consumption merely reflects its size, and says 
nothing about the "quality", i.e. its effectiveness. Dramatic changes in the global 
economy have fundamentally changed the environment in which states operate, 
and the state is no longer seen merely as a provider, but as facilitator and 
regulator. Since there is, also a predominance of "developing" countries in the 
sample, which lie in the "increasing" portion of the curve, results for the size of 
government variable should be interpreted with caution. 
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Finally, the measures of institutional capital used in the study are far from 
perfect, and do not capture all of the dimensions of institutions. Differences in 
Level 1 (Williamson, 2000) institutions are also not captured in this study, a factor 
that could be a significant source of variation in growth rates. A theoretical 
discussion of cultural differences and long-run economic performance is provided 
by Lal (1998), which could be used as the building block for empirical testing of 
this factor endowment as an important source of growth differences. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
[1] Acemoglu .D, Robinson .J, The Role of Institutions in Growth and 
Development, Review of Economics and Institutions, Vol. 1 – No. 2, fall 2010. 
[2] Acemoglu.D, Johnson .S, Robinson J. A., Institutions As A Fundamental Cause 
Of Long-Run Growth, Handbook Of Economic Growth, Volume Ia. Edited By 
Philippe Aghion And Steven N. Durlauf , Elsevier B.V 2005.  
[3] Bertram C. I. Okpokwasili, Institutions and Development: Are Some More 
Critical Than Others? -A Cross-Section Empirical Analysis of 54 Countries, 
journal of business and public affairs , volume 1, Issue 2 ,2007, pp:08-24. 
[4] Bartlett. W, Nevenka c, K. I. Jurlin, Aleksandra Nojkovic, Vesna Popovski, 
Institutional Quality and Growth in EU Neighbourhood Countries, Wp5/11 
Search Working Paper, Institutional quality and growth, January 2013. 
[5] Douglass C. North, Institutions, Journal of Economic Perspectives- Volume5, 
Number1 -Winter 1991-Pages 97-112. 
[6] Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp: 01-05. 
[7] De-Xing Guan, Growth Theory Needs an Institutional Structure, December 
2008 (revised May 2009).  
[8] Glaeser .E.L, La Porta. R, Silanes. F.L.D, shleifer A., Do Institutions Cause 
Growth? , journal of economic growth, 9,271-303, 2004.  
[9] Gwartney. J, Lawson .R & Hall .J, Economic Freedom of the World 2013 
Annual Report, Fraser Institute ©2013 • www.fraserinstitute.org • 
www.freetheworld.com. 
[10] Hakura. D, Growth in the Middle East and North Africa, IMF/AMF High-
Level Seminar on Institutions and Economic Growth in the Arab Countries, 
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates December 19-20, 2006.  
[11] Janvier D. Nkurunziza and Robert H. Bates, Political Institutions and 
Economic Growth in Africa, CID Working Paper No. 98 March 2003. 
[12] Janine .A, Growth and Institutions: The World Bank Research Observer, 
vol. 15, no. 1 (February 2000), pp. 99–135. 
[13] Ménard .C and Shirley M. M., the Contribution of Douglass North to New 
Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. DRAFT for 
editors June 21, 2011. 
[14] McMahon .F, Institutions and Economic, Political, and Civil Liberty in the 
Arab World, Economic Freedom of the World 2014,PP;07-29 
 
 
 
14
 
[15] Subramanian. A, the Evolution of Institutions in India and its Relationship 
with Economic Growth, Johns Hopkins University, April 2007. 
[16] Sanjeev K. S, Quality of Institutions and Economic Growth in Developing 
Economies, Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2176542 
[17] Tarik M. Y, Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and 
North Africa since 1950, Journal of Economic Perspectives-Volume 18, Number 
3-Summer 2004-P:91-116. 
[18] Valeriani .E, Peluso .S, Reggio .E, the Impact of Institutional Quality on 
Economic Growth and Development: An Empirical Study, Journal of 
Knowledge Management, Economics and Information Technology, Issue 6 
October 2011. 
[19] Vijayaraghavan. M, AWard.W,  Institutions and Economic Growth: 
Empirical Evidence from a Cross-National Analysis, Center of international 
trade, working paper 001302, PP: 02-25. 
[20] World Bank list of economies (July 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
